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Abstract 
A  large  percentage  of  the  population  in  developing  countries  saves,  remits  money  or 
accesses  credit  using  informal  financial  services.  Financial  inclusion  initiatives  aim  to 
expand  the  reach  and  attractiveness  of  formal  financial  services.  Recently,  the  Financial 
Action  Task  Force  embraced  financial  inclusion  as  complementary  to  anti‐money 
laundering and counter‐terrorist financing as it enhances financial transparency. Analyzing 
preliminary  data  from  FinScope  surveys  on  eight  African  countries  we  argue  that  an 
increase  in  access  to  formal  services  does  not  automatically  imply  an  immediate  and 
corresponding  reduction of usage of  informal  services,  especially as many  individuals use 
informal and formal services in parallel. We consider customer trade‐offs regarding the use 
of  formal  and  informal  services  especially  considering  transparency  as  a  potential 
disincentive  to use  formal  services. The alignment of  financial  inclusion and  integrity will 
fail where customers are apprehensive about increased transparency. 
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I. Introduction 
A large portion of the population in developing countries operates in the cash-based 
informal economy. They save, remit money and access credit via non-regulated and 
non-supervised financial services. Financial inclusion initiatives of multilateral agencies 
are aimed at extending formal financial services to those who are currently not using 
such services (CGAP 2009). Inclusion into formal financial services, it is argued, 
contributes to economic growth as well as to poverty reduction. To aid higher levels of 
inclusion, entry thresholds that have excluded socially vulnerable customers such as 
affordability, eligibility and geographical outreach barriers are being addressed.  
In June 2011 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting 
body for anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), 
expressed support for financial inclusion and stated that financial exclusion is a risk to 
financial integrity. A key underlying motivation for their support is the view that an 
expansion of formal financial services will improve law enforcement by increasing the 
number of transactions that become subject to AML/CFT controls and monitoring. In 
terms of this approach financial inclusion and financial integrity are complementary 
policy objectives. 
The hypothesis that underpins the FATF support is that the expansion of formal financial 
services translates into a corresponding reduction of informal financial services, thereby 
increasing the reach and effectiveness of AML/CFT controls. 
In this paper we question this hypothesis in relation to developing countries. There are 
indications that a significant portion of the population in developing countries uses formal 
and informal financial services in parallel. We present preliminary evidence drawn from 
FinScope studies on eight African countries (Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) on the use of formal and informal finance. 
According to this evidence uptake of formal financial services does not appear to 
translate into an immediate and corresponding lowering of the usage of informal financial 
services. 
We discuss the continued usage of informal financial services from the perspective of 
the cost-benefit trade-offs that customers make when choosing between formal and 
informal services, including parallel usage. This paper highlights aspects of identification 
and related transparency of personal financial transactions to government and private 
sector players and the potential impact that it may have on the trade-offs customers 
make. Where customers are apprehensive about increased transparency, we hold that it 
will impact on these trade-offs.  
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The paper is at the intersection of different strands of the literature. For example, there 
are papers devoted to access to finance (Klein and Dittus 2011) and behavioral trade-
offs (Della Vigna 2009) as well as papers on incentives to operate in the shadow 
economy (Thomas 1992; Lippert and Walker 1997; Feige 1989; Schneider 2001; 
Schneider and Enste 2002; Schneider 2005; Schneider and Enste 2007; Feld and 
Schneider 2010), on confidentiality and trust in service providers (Liao, Liu and Chen 
2011) and on privacy and anti-money laundering (Angell and Demetis 2005; Sharman 
2009). We use these different strands as a point of departure for our analysis and, as a 
novel contribution to the literature, explore the role of transparency in the cost benefit 
analyses of users.. 
II. Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity 
2.1 Financial Inclusion Initiatives  
“Financial inclusion” can be defined in general as ensuring access to formal financial 
services at an affordable cost in a fair and transparent manner.2 For purposes of this 
paper, the broad, descriptive definition adopted by the FATF in their 2011 guidance note 
entitled Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial 
Inclusion is apposite: 
“In general terms, financial inclusion is about providing access to an adequate range 
of safe, convenient and affordable financial services to disadvantaged and other 
vulnerable groups, including low income, rural and undocumented persons, who have 
been underserved or excluded from the formal financial sector. It is also, on the other 
hand, about making a broader range of financial services available to individuals who 
currently only have access to basic financial products.” (FATF 2011a: 12). 
In the past decade the multilateral agencies have promoted financial sector deepening 
as a means to improve economic growth, to reduce poverty and promote social 
inclusion. Perceived benefits of financial inclusion, preliminary data and strong anecdotal 
evidence (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan 2008; The All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on Microfinance 2011: 16-19) allowed financial inclusion to progress from a narrow focus 
on access to micro-credit to a broader concept that incorporates remittances, savings 
and insurance products (Dittus and Klein 2011). Today financial inclusion is supported 
by bodies as diverse as the United Nations, the G20, the European Commission, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a host of multilateral agencies and non-
governmental organizations. 
Amongst those not using formal financial services are persons who elect not to use such 
services (the voluntarily self-excluded) because they have no need of such services, 
                                             
2 In chapter III we discuss the distinction of formal and informal services. 
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decline to use them for religious or cultural reasons (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Honohan 
2009: 122) or lack trust in formal financial institutions, for example where they 
experienced bank failure or fear fraud (Dittus and Klein 2011: 4). Those who wish to 
access formal financial services may face barriers such as affordability (as formal 
services are often too costly for low income persons), inappropriate product design 
(resulting in products that do not meet the needs of excluded customers) and inability to 
meet eligibility criteria (for example not having sufficient assets to meet conditions for the 
extension of a loan or being unable to provide documentation evidencing identity) 
(European Commission 2008: 40-47, Bester et al. 2008: 5-7). Customers who scaled 
access barriers may, however, also withdraw from formal financial services. The 
FinScope 2004 report on South Africa found for instance that more than 3,5 million 
adults in South Africa held bank accounts and then withdrew from the system (FinScope 
2004: 12). Previously banked customers may withdraw from formal financial services for 
a variety of reasons including costs, lack of trust, bad credit records, difficulties 
managing spending and inappropriate product design (Ellison, Whyley and Forster 2010: 
15-16). For purposes of this paper it is also helpful to distinguish between take-up of 
formal financial services (for example opening a bank account) and the usage of the 
bank account. Many formerly excluded clients may be persuaded to open an account 
that is designed to meet their requirements, but experience has shown many of these 
accounts may become dormant. Take-up therefore does not necessarily translate into 
active usage of an account for day-to-day transactions (Bankable Frontier Associates 
2010; Platt et al. 2011). 
Population groups that are financially excluded show a degree of similarity globally. For 
example, rural communities are often more affected than urban communities as 
geographical distance to urban centers tend to reduce financial access. Socially 
vulnerably persons such as the poor and undocumented persons make up the bulk of 
those who are often referred to as “unbanked” (European Commission 2008: 30-38).  
In recent years initiatives to increase financial inclusion in developing countries has 
focused increasingly on the use of technology. Mobile banking is particularly prominent 
in this regard. Mobile banking models leverage off the enormous success of mobile 
phone uptake in developing countries by using the phone as a key channel to reach  
new and underserved customers (Pickens, Porteous and Rotman 2009). It was 
estimated in 2009 that more than 1 billion persons without bank accounts had mobile 
phones (Pickens 2009). Mobile banking models rely generally on a large range of non-
traditional agents such as retailers to provide cash-in and cash-out functions. This 
enables service providers to extend their reach while keeping service costs low (Chatain 
et al. 2008).  
Financial inclusion initiatives, including mobile banking developments, in a number of 
countries were hampered by, amongst others, regulatory concerns regarding the 
 5
compliance of proposed new regulatory models with international financial integrity 
standards (Chatain et al. 2011: xxix-xxx). 
 
2.2 Financial Integrity Concerns   
Financial integrity is a broad term that has lately been used to refer to measures that 
protect financial services against abuse for money laundering and terrorist financing 
purposes.  
For more than two decades countries have been developing AML/CFT laws within a 
framework of international standards, referred to as “Recommendations”, set by the 
FATF, an  intergovernmental body based at the OECD in Paris.  
The AML/CFT strategy is aimed at excluding criminal proceeds from financial services 
and at monitoring customer activity to detect suspicious transactions and confidentially 
report them to intelligence and law enforcement authorities. Interestingly there is little 
indication that note was taken of research on drivers of participation in the shadow 
economy when the FATF strategies were formulated in 1990. The impact of increased 
AML/CFT surveillance on the willingness of customers to remain within the formal 
financial system has therefore not received much attention. 
Globally, more than 180 jurisdictions have committed themselves to implementing the 
FATF recommendations. The FATF, the World Bank, the IMF and various FATF-style 
regional bodies cooperate to monitor the levels of implementation of the 
Recommendations. Countries are subjected to stringent evaluation procedures that 
result in ratings for their compliance with each of the standards (IMF 2011: 6-13). 
Countries with a lack of commitment to AML/CFT controls and those with strategic 
deficiencies in their controls are identified and where appropriate, compliant countries 
are required to ensure that their financial institutions take appropriate due diligence 
measures when dealing with institutions and persons from those countries. In practice, 
those steps can impact negatively on the economies of such countries (IMF 2011: 82-
84). 
The manner in which countries design their AML/CFT requirements can impact on 
financial inclusion initiatives, for example by increasing compliance costs, by creating 
additional regulatory hurdles for new service providers, and by posing eligibility barriers 
for potential new customers. The latter refers especially to the requirement of the FATF’s 
Recommendation 5 that countries should ensure that financial institutions identify and 
verify the identities of their customers “using reliable, independent source documents, 
data or information”. These identification and verification processes are referred to as 
“Know Your Customer” or KYC measures. Secure identification is, however, a challenge 
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in many developing countries. Amongst the countries that piloted the provision of formal 
financial services to the poor, two broad, sometimes overlapping, trends are noticeable: 
i. Improvement of national identification systems: In some countries financial 
inclusion provides impetus to, or leverages off, extensive national identification 
programs. Examples are India’s Aadhaar biometric identification program that is 
aimed at providing a unique identity number to each of its 1,2 billion residents 
(Dass 2011: 4) and to reach around 600 million residents within the next four 
years (Gold 2011: 11) while Pakistan leverages off its NADRA biometric national 
identity card data (CGAP 2010: 6) that was gathered since 2000 on 96 million 
citizens. 
ii. Reduction of identification requirements: Many piloting countries adopted 
simplified identification and verification requirements in relation to products 
posing low levels of risk, for example where strict usage and transaction limits 
apply. Examples are Mexico (allowed electronic verification instead of 
documentary verification), South Africa (dispensing with address verification 
requirements) (FATF 2011a: 61-64) and India (introducing a referral system for 
basic bank accounts).  
Regulators in many other developing countries feared a negative FATF compliance 
report and were reluctant to allow simplified KYC measures, thereby excluding those 
persons who are unable for present formal documentation evidencing their identities 
(Bester et al. 2008; De Koker 2006; Chatain et al. 2011: xxix-xxx). After calls from 
developing countries and NGOs, the FATF agreed to provide appropriate guidance that 
would ensure that countries could adopt a more flexible, risk-based approach aligning 
financial inclusion and financial integrity. In June 2011 the FATF, working in conjunction 
with the World Bank and the Asia-Pacific Group, issued a guidance paper endorsing 
responsible, risk-based measures that are aimed at increasing financial inclusion (FATF 
2011). In this guidance paper, it classifies financial exclusion as a factor undermining the 
effectiveness of AML/CFT controls:  
“It is acknowledged at the same time that financial exclusion works against effective 
AML/CFT policies. Indeed the prevalence of a large informal, unregulated and 
undocumented economy negatively affects AML/CFT efforts and the integrity of the financial 
system. Informal, unregulated and undocumented financial services and a pervasive cash 
economy can generate significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks and 
negatively affect AML/CFT preventive, detection and investigation/prosecution efforts.” 
(FATF 2011a: 15-16) 
In the guidance paper the FATF also mentions that financial inclusion will benefit 
transparency (FATF 2011a: 16): “Moving cash transactions from the informal to the 
formal financial system makes it easier to detect and combat money laundering and 
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terrorist financing. The audit trail is increased and the flow of money used for money 
laundering and terrorist financing becomes traceable.” 
 
2.3 Increased Transparency of Financial Transactions 
Transparency as used in this paper refers to formal identification of individuals, collection 
and recording of personal financial information as well as disclosure of personal data to 
third parties. Transparency levels are particularly high in the AML/CFT context. 
AML/CFT measures require financial institutions to identify a client, to verify a client’s 
identity, to scrutinize the client’s transactions for possible suspicious activity and to 
report these to the authorities without informing the client concerned. They also extend 
to making client records available to law enforcement authorities to investigate and 
prosecute alleged offences. AML/CFT measures were adopted in part to counter bank 
secrecy and transparency of financial transactions is therefore a key objective of 
AML/CFT measures. 
The identification of increased transparency as a desired outcome of financial inclusion, 
at least from a FATF perspective, introduces a potentially adverse element into financial 
inclusion dynamics. While AML/CFT transparency is an entrenched element of modern 
formal financial services, financial inclusion is often framed altruistically in the context of 
discussions of multilateral agencies. It is embedded in the pro-poor framework and is 
aimed at empowering socially vulnerable and especially low-income customers. In the 
international discussions, the positive impact of financial inclusion on the well-being of 
individuals are typically stressed. 
Transparency, however, is a double-edged sword from a consumer’s perspective. While 
transparency can hold benefits for a customer, for instance by providing easier proof that 
a specific transaction was conducted, it also improves access to customer information by 
third parties. These parties include law enforcement authorities in countries with less 
benevolent governments, who could use the information to track and target political 
opponents. Personal information can be abused for criminal or commercial objectives. 
Negative externalities can therefore arise from increased transparency. 
Until the release of the FATF paper in June 2011 the debate regarding FATF standards 
and their impact on financial inclusion focused mainly on the fact that socially vulnerable 
clients were excluded by rigid and conservative KYC measures (De Koker 2006; Bester 
et al. 2008; Isern and de Koker 2009; WSBI 2009; Chatain et al. 2011; Alexandre, Mas 
and Radcliffe 2011: 127-129). In this paper, however, we consider the matter from a 
client perspective. We look at FinScope data regarding client behavior in eight African 
countries and focus specifically on indications of choices between formal and informal 
financial services. In this context, we raise questions regarding transparency as an 
additional disincentive to use formal financial services for some clients.  
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FinScope is a recurring national household survey that provides the most 
comprehensive data focused on the financial services needs and usage for key countries 
in Africa. First piloted in 2002 in South Africa, its South African dataset is the most 
comprehensive FinScope set tracking changes in consumer behavior. See the Appendix 
for more information about the surveys reflected in this paper.  
III. Informal Financial Services 
We apply FinScope and FinAccess terminology when differentiating between formal and 
informal financial services (see Table 1 and Figure 1). For example, the term “informal 
financial services” is used in this paper to refer to financial services in developing 
countries that are rendered outside of the scope of the formally regulated and supervised 
financial services sector. 
Informal financial services are often based upon local traditions and have existed in 
different forms and sizes for long periods. These services are generally based upon 
social networks in local communities as well as mutual trust that members of these 
mechanisms reciprocally place in each other. Underlying agreements are verbal and 
often implicit and in case of a breach of the agreement, enforcement is informal, for 
example by bringing peer pressure to bear on the party who breaches the agreement.3  
Informal financial services are generally used for bridging short-term liquidity constraints 
or for investment of surplus liquidity (savings) locally among friends, relatives and 
business networks. Therefore, they fulfill an important mechanism in the financial live of 
individuals. Examples from different countries are Rotating Savings and Credit 
Association (ROSCAs), Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs), 
savings clubs, self-help groups, funeral & burial societies, moneylenders, Hawalas and 
Village Community Banks (VICOBAs).  
Formal financial services refer to services provided by banks, post banks and insurance 
companies and are subject to laws, regulations and prudential supervision. The business 
relationships between institutions and their customers are governed by formal written 
contracts, often in the form of standard agreements, and these are – at least theoretically 
– enforceable in court. 
 
INSERT Table 1 here. 
 
The ‘formal-other’ category includes providers, which are also regarded as ‘semi-formal,’ 
because they are sometimes registered, but they are in general not supervised by the 
financial sector supervisor. Client relationships may be governed by written contracts, 
                                             
3 In consumer group discussions in Tanzania and Kenya, such informal enforcement was reported. It even included 
repossession. 
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but this is not always the case. This category also captures non-traditional banking 
services such as remittances via mobile phones. This category has recently been 
introduced in Tanzania, for example, in the 2009 FinScope survey.4  
Finally, the ‘excluded’ category captures all individuals that neither use formal financial 
services nor informal services.  
It is important to note that  persons can move in and out of these different services and, 
in particular, can also withdraw from formal financial services (FinScope 2004: 12, 
Ellison, Whyley and Forster 2010: 15-16). 
 
3.1 Parallel Usage of Formal and Informal Financial Services   
Table 2 presents preliminary statistics on access strands in eight African countries. Note 
that these strands are mutually exclusive. For example, in Kenya 37.5 percent of adult 
population used only informal services and 18.9 percent used only formal services in 
2006. Thus, these numbers say nothing about the parallel usage of services. Moreover, 
no conclusions on complementary usage of products can be drawn from these statistics. 
Statistics on parallel usage in a sub-group of countries are discussed in 3.2 below.  
In five of the eight countries, the percentage of the adult population using only informal 
services increased. This has happened in parallel to an increase of the share of persons 
using only formal finance, which is observable in most countries of our sample. 
 
INSERT Table 2 here. 
 
We caution that countries should not be compared to each other due to differences in 
survey methods. For instance, the sample for Botswana (2004) is unweighted, whereas 
the ones for other countries are weighted (see the Appendix for information on the data 
sources).  Moreover, inter-temporal trends should also be compared with caution. For 
example, in the Kenyan case, the 2009 sample of respondents did not reflect the gender 
distribution in the population. Therefore, the sample was corrected by weighting to 
ensure that gender distribution was similar to the national gender distribution (FinAccess 
2009: 7). This weighted sample should therefore not be compared with earlier 
unweighted samples. 
In Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania the percentage of adults using only informal 
finance is decreasing. These trends are due to different developments in the individual 
countries. For example, the growth in formally included population in Kenya is mainly 
attributable to new mobile phone services for mobile money transfers classified in 
                                             
4  Mobile banking was included as ‘semi‐formal,’ which is subsumed under ‘formal‐other’ category herein. 
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‘formal–other’ category (FinAccess 2009: 11). In South Africa, main drivers for increased 
banking levels were persons moving back into the sector after the financial crisis and the 
adoption of basic bank accounts (called Mzansi accounts and discussed in 3.2 below). In 
Tanzania, the introduction of a category denoted ‘semi-formal–other’ into the FinScope 
survey accounts for the larger share in the 2.2% increase in the use of semi-formal 
services. The category includes mobile payments services of a larger provider active in 
several African countries. This service did not exist in 2006 (FinScope 2009). 
 
INSERT Figure 1 here. 
 
Figure 1 visualizes financial inclusion and the use of multiple products. FinScope holds 
that the categories ‘formal’ plus ‘formal-other’ constitute the ‘formally included’ stratum 
and these two categories plus the ‘informal’ category constitute the ‘financially included’ 
stratum of the population. For purposes of consistency we employ that terminology in 
this paper too.  
3.2 Complementarities of Formal and Informal Instruments   
It has long been noticed that specific types of formal and informal financial services may 
be complementary in nature rather than substitutive (Ghate 1992, Obwona and 
Musinguzi 1998, Bankable Frontiers 2007, and Collins et al. 2009). A complementary 
relationship means that products are used jointly or, in the broader sense, when usage 
of one service does not crowd out the other.5 In a somewhat less extreme form they are 
used in parallel and the use of one service does not substitute usage of the other. In fact 
demand for both service types may even be positively correlated.  
Complementarity is in general not a static quality. For example, if formal financial 
services are effectively adjusted to meet the needs of poor persons, are affordable and 
accessible and provide additional benefits beyond what informal services can provide, 
they would tend to replace informal services. When circumstances change, this trend 
could become reversed. As stated above, people could move in and out of formal and 
informal services. 
Parallel usage – at least to a certain extent – is also affirmed by the recent FinScope 
statistics. At the moment, we can only present preliminary figures, which do not allow 
firm conclusions to be drawn. However, it is clear that a significant portion of the banked 
population continues to use informal finance, despite having taken up formal financial 
products, for example by opening a bank account.  
                                             
5 Consider a loan at a formal institution. If the borrower cannot pay an installment, the person might turn to informal 
lenders  to  cover  the  installment with  funds  from  that  source.  If  this  is  recurring  frequently,  both  are positively 
associated with each other on average. 
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Table 3 presents the trends in the increase/decrease of share of the total population 
using informal finance and the share of banked persons, i.e. users of formal financial 
products, also using informal products. 
 
INSERT Table 3 here. 
 
In South Africa, for example, it seems that the number of banked individuals who also 
use informal instruments has increased since 2006. This trend is also evident in Uganda, 
but not in Botswana. We caution that these datasets are not sufficiently complete to 
warrant any firm conclusions at this stage, however, they do provide a preliminary 
impression of the developments in the countries. 
In South Africa, the Mzansi account, a low-cost basic bank account is certainly a driver 
for the use of formal services. First offered in 2004, more than six million accounts were 
opened by 2008. While take-up of the product was impressive, actual usage is more 
limited. A significant percentage of these accounts are dormant, if not permanently then 
for periods of more than 12 months. A 2009 study found that nearly 42% of the Mzansi 
accounts at the four largest commercial banks were inactive (Bankable Frontier 
Associates 2009 28). Key reasons for dormancy including a lack of funds, the need to 
use non-Mzansi accounts and dissatisfaction of the Mzansi account itself (Bankable 
Frontier Associates 2009 53). In addition, many Mzansi accounts are mainly used to 
receive a salary, remittance payment or social benefit payment, most of which is 
immediately withdrawn after it was deposited into the account. The Mzansi account 
balances average around USD 28 with a median of around USD 6 (Bankable Frontier 
Associates 2009; Bankable Frontier Associates 2010). Since 2004 the shift from informal 
services and cash transactions to the Mzansi account and related formal financial 
services was far smaller than indicated by the number of accounts. Similar patterns of 
relative low levels of account usage and significant levels of dormancy of basic bank 
accounts have also been experienced in India (Platt et al. 2011).Many clients who 
opened these accounts revert to informal financial services or continue to channel some 
or even the majority of their transactions via informal services. 
 
INSERT Table 4 here. 
Of the countries reflected in this study only five countries have more detailed FinScope 
data on parallel usage of financial products, but only for one or two years. The 
preliminary picture derived from Table 4 is that while a larger share in the adult 
population uses only informal financial services, among parallel customers, the most 
common is to combine several types (informal, formal-other and formal).  Moreover, it 
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seems to be more common to combine informal and formal-other services than 
combining informal and formal, at least in some countries.  
IV. Incentives to Use Informal Finance 
While the subject of parallel usage is not new, we argue that it provides perspectives on 
the FATF’s expectations that financial inclusion will assist in moving cash transactions 
from the informal to the formal financial system and aid the detection of combating of 
money laundering and terrorist financing. We relate to transparency and its role in typical 
customer cost-benefit trade-offs in the context of financial inclusion.  
4.1 Economic Trade­offs   
An economic trade-off in this context is a cost-benefit analysis that persons undertake 
when they choose between using informal or formal financial services or using both in 
parallel.6 In terms of a trade-off, a person’s choice to use an informal service rather than 
a formal one to perform a particular transaction, or to use both in combination, depends 
on the net benefit that is derived.  
In this paper we focus on the general customers of financial products. We are therefore 
not concerned with trade-offs made by minority groups such as criminals or terrorists. In 
general, however, they would include the probability of detection and law enforcement 
action such as asset freezing and forfeiture into their cost-benefit calculus, which are not 
factors that normal customers would deem relevant.  
From an economic point of view, individuals can only optimally choose if they know all 
costs and benefits involved. There are specific factors, however, that impact on cost-
benefit analyses such as salience and distraction, for example. This is explained with a 
simple expected utility function .  
                                                   (1) 
In (1), the expected utility derived from consuming a financial service is the individual’s 
valuation v minus its price P for the service minus additional costs c that either realize 
with probability   or not ( ) with 10  .  
Now consider some costs, which may be unrelated to the price and which are not 
obvious for individuals, i.e. they do not stand out as a quality of the service. This aspect 
is denoted in (2) with an inattention factor .7 
                                    (2) 
                                             
6 There are also psychological and social costs and benefits, but we will exclude them for this discussion. 
7  If  0 ,  there  is  full  attention  and  if  ,  there  is  distraction  (Della  Vigna  2009).  This  means  persons  are 
distracted by evaluating  the  goods/service  transaction and pay  less attention  to  information externalities arising 
from the information transaction, which is a by‐product to the service transaction. 
EU (.)
EU (.)  v  P  c  (1   )c
1
1
EU(.)  v  P  (1 )(c  (1)c) 
 1
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Persons will primarily pay attention to the obvious and tangible benefits they obtain from 
a transaction as well as its costs (denoted with v-P), i.e. it is the more salient aspects of 
the above transaction that will enter an individual’s trade-off. Transparency, however, is 
often not a salient aspect in the decision of obtaining a financial service.  
Increased transparency arises, for example, through identification of the individual and 
electronic transaction monitoring. This increases the visibility of the customer’s private 
information to third parties, known and unknown, including government. Transparency 
could have unforeseen effects, for example when information originally collected for one 
purpose will be accessed and used for another purpose, not anticipated by the customer. 
In this case externalities arise. For example, an individual signs up for a mobile bank 
account. At a later stage the government accesses the account information for tax 
enforcement purposes. The individual, however, was unaware of this possibility and has 
not factored these costs in when signing up for the financial service. 
Such externalities are not negotiated upfront to the deal-making and are not terms of the 
contract. Individuals cannot factor them into their trade-off and this leads to a less-than-
optimal outcome for them as they underestimate the actual costs involved. Of course 
other examples of purpose diversion are also possible, such as the use of personal 
information for marketing purposes. Once data is collected for purposes of a formal 
financial relationship it can effectively be used for other purposes.  
4.2 Incentives to Use Formal and Informal Services  
According to the FinScope surveys the main reasons for using informal financial services 
are their affordability and the fact that they are geographically easily accessible by 
customers. Affordability relates to costs such as bank charges and fees related with 
savings/transaction accounts or loans. Accessibility, on the other hand, relates to the 
difficulty of reaching a bank service point, as banks in the surveyed countries are mostly 
clustered in urban areas and ATMs are not always available. Further, regarding savings, 
transaction accounts and increasingly also remittances, eligibility also plays a role. As 
discussed earlier, eligibility relates to an individual’s qualification for the particular 
services, for example the ability to present legal identity documents or proof of address. 
 
INSERT Table 5 here. 
 
Except for situations of necessity, where the outcome is mandated by law, regulation or 
rule (for example where an employer requires employees to open accounts to receive 
salaries or where a government pays social welfare payments into accounts) an 
individual’s choice whether to use formal or informal financial services will generally be 
based on the trade-off made. A selection of considerations is set out in Table 5. 
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At this stage, there is limited research on transparency and cost-benefit trade-offs 
individuals make with regard to financial products. This is an area for future research. 
 
4.3 Transparency and the Choice between Formal and Informal 
Financial Services  
In the following discussion, we consider transparency elements of formal and informal 
financial services. Informal services are sometimes described as anonymous, especially 
by law enforcement representatives. In informal services, however, the transaction 
parties often know each other or have sufficient personal contact to be able to identify 
one another. In informal groups such as ROSCAs, the relationship involves many parties 
who know one another and have information about each other’s financial affairs.  
Formal financial services, on the other hand, are generally less transparent at the 
community- and customer-level, but more transparent to the management of the 
institution and government agencies. Moreover, providers of formal financial services 
generally collect extensive client data and store it for long periods. These records can be 
accessed with relative ease by third parties, subject to any legal barriers that may apply 
and are observed.   
Government lacks similar easy access to information in relation to informal financial 
services. Information on a user of informal financial services can, of course, be accessed 
by interviewing the other party or parties. The authorities, however, face information 
access barriers as they have to identify, locate and interview those parties, who may not 
necessarily prove cooperative. Moreover, there is often no transactional record and this 
complicates attempts to trace transactions and parties. 
While this discussion outlines differences and similarities between informal and formal 
financial services, it is important to appreciate that transparency levels differ within each 
of those services. Transparency levels will be higher among the peers where informal 
services are rendered within a small and closed community and interaction is repeated. 
Transparency, however, is different in an urban environment where the customer and 
provider do not know each other personally and transactions might be once-off.  
Transparency levels also differ between products. A provider, for example, will typically 
have a greater incentive to gather and verify more information about a customer when a 
secured loan is advanced but may ask fewer questions when delivering a remittance 
service.  
In formal services weaknesses in AML/CFT controls can be used to hide a customer’s 
true identity, for example by colluding with bank agents or using false identity 
documentation. However, customers of formal financial services generally need to go to 
extraordinary lengths to remain anonymous users. In an environment where informal 
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financial services are available, the easier and safer option for normal users who wish to 
avoid transparency would therefore generally be to opt for continued use of informal 
financial services, at least for sensitive transactions (Bester et al. 2008: 24, 39). 
Early studies of M-PESA clients in Kenya provide a few preliminary perspectives on 
consumer attitudes to the relevance of transparency in Kenya. Morawczynski, for 
example, identified Kenyan M-PESA consumers who indicated that they use mobile 
banking services to hide their income and savings from their spouses and family 
members (Jakiela and Ozier 2011, Castilla 2011). Value can be transferred and received 
and account balances can be checked in private (Morawczynski 2009). While this 
decreases transparency towards peers, using the services increases transparency to the 
telecom operator and third parties – an aspect that is often not salient for users. 
It can reasonably be expected that transparency concerns would differ from region to 
region and would reflect the level of crime in society and the level of trust in institutions 
and government in that society. In Africa, trust might be generated through tribal 
connections. For example, Morawczynski and Miscione record an interview where a 
consumer expressed a lack of confidence in one bank, and trust in another institution, 
due to the ethnicity and nationality of their respective CEOs (Morawczynski and Miscione 
2008: 296). 
The type of information that new clients of financial services would wish to remain 
confidential, has not been probed to date. A study by Statistics South Africa shed some 
light on general concerns of South African citizens. A focus group-based study, surveyed 
perceptions and concerns of South Africans regarding the national census (Statistics 
South Africa 2004). Residents in informal settlements expressed concern about the 
confidentiality of their personal information. They were particularly concerned that 
criminals may obtain access to some of their personal details. Age, income, identity 
numbers, HIV status and political affiliation were identified as particularly sensitive. 
Financial institutions collect information relating to age, income and identity numbers of 
customers, where such numbers are available. While they may not intentionally gather 
information about a customer’s health or political affiliation, such information might be 
revealed due to transaction on an account, for example when the customer makes a 
donation to a political party, pays members’ fees, procures health insurance or pays 
medical expenses.  
A clear picture of the extent of privacy concerns of new clients of financial services has 
not yet emerged. The little information that exists is derived from studies on attitudes and 
views of consumers. However, it is important to differentiate between views on privacy 
as expressed in surveys and actual actions relating to disclosure of personal information 
that individuals take when they transact in the market place (Jentzsch, Harasser and 
Preibusch forthcoming).  
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With respect to the former, Jack and Suri (2011), for example, surveyed 3.000 randomly 
selected households in Kenya in 2008 and followed it up reaching 2.016 of the same 
households in 2009. Amongst others, they probed the reasons why households would 
use or decline to use M-PESA for saving purposes (Mas and Radcliffe 2010: 24). Only 
2% of M-PESA users indicated concern about confidentiality as a barrier for using M-
PESA for savings in 2008 and in 2009. The same percentage (2%) of non-users stated 
the same reason for not using M-PESA for savings.8  
Whether the findings of the study reflect the attitudes of the participants correctly 
depends on factors such as whether the surveyed households understood what is meant 
by ‘confidentiality’ and whether they knew how many parties can potentially gain access 
to their personal data, which is generated by using M-PESA. If there is little knowledge 
about potential threats to privacy, concerns about it will not show up in a survey.9 Should 
the participants understand and appreciate the risks, the survey may reflect current 
attitudes. However it may not provide insight as to their attitude once an event occurred 
that would normally escalate levels of concern, for example when their privacy is 
compromised by an abuse of the data. 
In different countries, consumers are undergoing mandatory registration of mobile phone 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards (Jentzsch 2011) entailing, for example, that 
clients have to register their prescribed personal details at telecom operators. Anecdotal 
evidence from newspaper articles10 and conversations with individuals from government 
institutions in different African countries suggest that Africans are increasingly becoming 
aware of  privacy implications of mobile phone usage. 
In 2009 KPMG published the results of a survey on consumers and digital technology. 
The survey, Consumers and Convergence III, reflected the views of more than 4,000 
people in 19 countries across Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa, North America, and 
Latin America (KPMG 2009). The study found high levels of concern regarding privacy. 
They asked consumers: “When using a mobile device, how concerned are you about the 
following?” One potential answer addressed privacy and allowed participants to rate their 
level of concern, if they had any. Overall 55 percent of the participants responded that 
they are very concerned about privacy when using a mobile phone device (KPMG 2009: 
24). In South Africa, however, the level of concern was higher, as 66 percent of the 
South African consumers were very concerned about their privacy and 26 percent 
somewhat concerned (Rizzo 2010: 10).11 KPMG’s follow-up study, Consumers and 
                                             
8 Other authors have stated that African users are less concerned than Western counterparts 
about the concept of privacy (Olinger, Britz and Olivier 2007). 
9 The authors of this article requested information on the exact question, but did not obtain an 
answer while writing this article. 
10 See Bizcommunity (2008); Malakata (2010); Staschewski (no date).  
11 KPMG conducted the survey between September and November, 2008. This included web-
based questions as well as face-to-face interviews with consumers. The South African 2009 and 
2010 data was kindly shared with the authors by Mr Frank Rizzo of KPMG. 
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Convergence, found that levels of concern increased (KPMG 2010).12 Amongst South 
African consumers, 69% were very concerned about their privacy and 24% somewhat 
concerned. The study also found high levels of concern in other developing countries. 
At this stage it is difficult to derive conclusive evidence on how widespread privacy 
concerns are in Africa, or how consumers would react to privacy breaches once they 
occur. While surveys are a first step to better understand privacy concerns among 
Africans, a more appropriate method to determine the relevance of confidentiality and 
privacy in economic transactions is to conduct experimental field research. It is 
submitted that such research should be undertaken to enable regulators and providers to 
understand the privacy attitudes and actions of new clients of formal financial services. 
4.4 Transparency and Mobile Banking  
Transparency and the information externalities arising therefrom can impact from two 
different but linked services that underpin mobile banking: (i) the financial service, where 
customers are identified and their financial transactions are monitored; and (ii) the 
underlying telecommunications service, where telecommunications customers are 
increasingly subject to SIM card registration, linking the customer to the SIM card and 
generally the handset that is used for mobile banking.  
Many African countries (for example, Kenya, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, 
Ghana and Nigeria) have joined other countries globally and made mobile phone SIM 
card registration mandatory (Jentzsch 2011). The key motivation for registration is to 
increase governments’ surveillance ability in order to combat crime. Where SIM cards 
are registered in the names of customers, authorities are able to track specific customers 
and to intercept their communications. In countries like Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, 
the registration processes coincided with the promotion of mobile banking for financial 
inclusion purposes. In South Africa, for example, mobile banking clients have to provide 
their personal details to their telecommunication service provider if they wish to gain 
access to the telecommunication service and to the bank, if they wish to obtain mobile 
banking services. The prescribed identification details that must be furnished to access 
the two services, differ (De Koker 2010).   
Mobile phone usage reveals much about the behavioral patterns, personal preferences 
and social networks of customers. The data is even richer where the customer also uses 
the mobile phone for financial transactions. Such data collections by the financial and the 
telecommunications service providers present considerable vulnerabilities and risks in 
                                             
12 The 2010 study surveyed more than 5000 consumers in 22 countries. Paradoxically, 58% of all 
respondents in this survey indicated a willingness to have their online usage and personal profile 
information tracked, if it resulted in lower costs (KPMG 2010: 6-7). Surveys results such as these, 
however, give rise the same questions outlined in relation to Jack and Suri’s survey results. 
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terms of abuse not only by the private sector and criminals (Ben-David et. al. 2010; 
Goodman and Harris 2010; Paik 2010, Jentzsch 2011) but also by authorities.  
SIM card registration data is for example also used for public order surveillance (African 
Press Agency 2010; Sessay, Karombo and Mulupi 2010). Communications are tracked 
to identify rioters (Mozambique) and messages are being monitored to identify hate mail 
and avert possible ethnic violence (Kenya). When citizens fear that such monitoring will 
be used to target legitimate political opposition, they may tend to withdraw or to restrict 
their usage of monitored channels. As stated above, a number of countries have now 
introduced SIM card registration and witnessed as immediate effect the reduction of the 
number of active SIM cards.13 There are several reasons why the number of active SIM 
cards decreases, among them dormancy or multiple SIM card holdings.  
In some countries, however, disconnections might be also due to political reasons. Early 
in 2011 more than 2 million SIM cards were disconnected in Zimbabwe because 
customers had failed to register their ownership (Davies 2011). It is not clear to what 
extent it played a role, but as anecdotal information links the failure of registration in part 
to users’ surveillance concerns.14 
Given the high levels of transparency in mobile banking, it is submitted that regulators 
and service providers should ensure that they understand customer attitudes to 
transparency. An improved understanding can assist regulators to consider ways in 
which customers can be provided with the required level of assurance and ways to 
protect mobile money systems in case of breaches of confidence and trust. Insight into 
customer attitudes to transparency will also inform a deeper understanding of general 
usage patterns of formal financial services.   
                                             
13 Balancing Act (2011). SIM registration in Africa: Subscribers number down but what about 
revenue and ARPU? No. 554 (13 May 2011), http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-
no-554 
14 This is based on views expressed in discussions with industry observers in Southern African 
and a small number of Zimbabwean customers  
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V. Concluding Observations 
In the past decade, multilateral agencies promoted access to formal finance as a means 
to increase economic growth and to combat poverty and social exclusion. Financial 
inclusion, especially where combined with mobile banking, SIM card registration and 
national identification programs, increases the transparency of large portions of societies 
in developing countries. Recently financial inclusion became aligned with the 
international efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. According to 
FATF financial exclusion undermines AML/CFT objectives. Financial inclusion is viewed, 
amongst others, as facilitating the monitoring of financial transactions and expanding 
surveillance capacities of law enforcement agencies. This surveillance capacity is 
particularly strong in relation to one of the prime vehicles for financial inclusion in 
developing countries – mobile banking. 
We hold that individuals conduct cost-benefit analyses when deciding whether to use 
informal financial services, formal financial services or both in combination. Customers of 
financial services, it is submitted, will in future increasingly factor transparency into their 
trade-offs when they understand, and are concerned about, transparency. The SIM card 
registration programs in different countries increased the level of awareness of the 
population regarding the transparency of mobile phone use. If users are apprehensive 
about transparency, for instance when they fear abuse of information by providers or 
government, transparency might become a disincentive to use formal financial services 
such as mobile banking. 
From an individual customer’s perspective financial inclusion may not be a permanent or 
all-encompassing state. Current customers may become unbanked and FinScope data 
shows that a significant group of financially included customers continue to use informal 
financial services. An increase in access to formal services has therefore not resulted in 
an immediate and corresponding reduction of usage of informal services. 
Serious consideration should be given to safeguard citizens’ trust that governments and 
providers will not abuse access to the service provider databases linked to financial 
inclusion products (De Koker 2011: 381-382). Lack of trust will be a barrier to financial 
inclusion. If abuse occurs, a deterioration in trust can also lead to a withdrawal from 
formal financial services or to a channeling of sensitive transactions via the informal 
sector.   
The alignment strategy between financial inclusion and financial integrity, it is submitted, 
will therefore fail where customers are concerned about the disclosure of their 
information to their government or other parties and decide against using formal financial 
services. This will be detrimental to the objectives of the FATF and of financial inclusion 
proponents. 
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The FATF has recently turned its attention to data protection and privacy (FATF 2011b: 
7). Unfortunately its focus is very much on data protection as an obstacle to AML/CFT 
information exchange. We believe that data protection and privacy should rather be 
embraced and supported by the FATF. After all, financial integrity is also based on 
integrity of information. The quality of information, in turn, is ensured by data protection 
principles. It is important to accept that governments may abuse national AML/CFT 
measures and their access to personal financial information of citizens to advance their 
own political agendas. Without effective data protection, citizens may act rationally by 
withdrawing, at least in part, into the informal economy, when their government or 
service providers fail to respect personal privacy. 
 
  
 21
References  
African Press Agency (2010). Mozambique imposes compulsory registration of mobile phone 
customers. AfriqueAvenir. 27 September 2010. 
 
Alexandre, C., I. Mas and D. Radcliffe (2010). Regulating new banking models that can bring 
financial services to all. Challenge Magazine 54(3): 116-134. 
 
Angell, I.O. and D.S. Demetis (2005). Systems thinking about anti-money-laundering: 
Considering the Greek case. Journal of Money Laundering Control. 8(3): 271-284. 
 
Bankable Frontier Associates (2007). Financial Service Access and Usage in Southern and East 
Africa: What Do the FinScope Surveys Tell Us?  FinMark Trust, Midrand. 
 
Bankable Frontier Associates (2009). The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative in South Africa – Final 
Report. FinMark Trust, Midrand. 
 
Bankable Frontier Associates (2010). South African Financial Diaries and the Mzansi Initiative: 
Five Years Later. FinMark Trust, Midrand. 
 
Bester, H., D. Chamberlain, L. de Koker, C, Hougaard, R. Short, A. Smith, & R. Walker (2008). 
Implementing FATF Standards in Developing Countries and Financial Inclusion: Findings and 
Guidelines. FIRST Initiative. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and P. Honohan. (2009). Access to financial services: Measurement, 
impact, and policies. The World Bank Research Observer 24(1): 119-145. 
 
Bizcommunity (2008). Concern over Botswana plan to register mobile phone subscribers,   
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/29/78/26332.html 
 
Castilla C. (2011). Intra-Household Allocation under Incomplete Information: Examination of 
Income-Hiding between Spouses. PhD Dissertation: The Ohio State University. 
 
Chatain, P-L., R, Hernández-Coss, K. Borowik, & A. Zerzan (2008). Integrity in Mobile Phone 
Financial Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing. World Banking Working Paper 146. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Chatain, P-L., A. Zerzan, W. Noor, N, Dannaoui and L. de Koker (2011). Protecting Mobile Money 
Against Financial Crimes – Global Policy Challenges and Solutions. The World Bank, Washington 
DC. 
 
Liao, C., C-C. Liu and K. Chen (2011). Examining the impact of privacy, trust and risk perceptions 
beyond monetary transactions: An integrated model. Electronic Commerce Research and 
Applications (forthcoming) 
 
Collins, D., J. Murdoch, S. Rutherford and O. Ruthven (2009). Portfolio's of the Poor: How the 
World's Poor live on Two Dollars a Day. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2009). Financial Access 2009: Measuring Access 
to Financial Services Around the World. CGAP, Washington DC. 
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2010). Update on Regulation of Branchless 
Banking in Pakistan.  CGAP, Washington DC. 
  
Dass, R. (2011). Unique identification for Indians: A divine dream or miscalculated heroism? 
Vikalpa 36(1): 1-13. 
 
Davies, S. (2011). Two million SIM card disconnected in Zimbabwe. Cellular News. 19 April 2011. 
 
DellaVigna S. (2009). Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field. Journal of Economic 
Literature 47: 315-372 
 22
 
De Koker, L. (2006). Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism: Some 
thoughts on the impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion. Journal of 
Financial Crime 13(1): 26-50.  
 
De Koker, L. (2010). Will RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet Anti-Money Laundering 
Requirements and Facilitate the Development of Transformational Mobile Banking in South 
Africa? An Exploratory Note. FinMark Trust, Midrand. 
 
De Koker, L. (2011). Aligning anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and 
financial inclusion: Questions to consider when FATF standards are clarified. Journal of Financial 
Crime 18(4): 361-386.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., T. Beck, and P. Honohan (2008). Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in 
Expanding Access. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Dittus, P. and M. Klein (2011). On Harnessing the Potential of Financial Inclusion, BIS Monetary 
and Economic Department. Working Papers. No 347. BIS, Basel. 
 
Ellison, A., C. Whyley and R. Forster (2010). Realising Banking Inclusion: The Achievements and 
Challenges. Financial Inclusion Task Force. HM Treasury, London. 
 
European Commission (2008). Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial 
Exclusion. Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels.  
 
Feige, E. L. (ed.) (1989). The Underground Economies. Tax Evasion and Information Distortion. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Feld, L.P and F. Schneider (2010), Survey on the shadow economy and undeclared earnings in 
OECD countries. German Economic Review (11)(2): 109-149. 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2010). Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods. 
FATF, Paris. 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2011a). Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Measures and Financial Inclusion. FATF, Paris. 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2011b). The Review of the Standards – Preparation for the 
4th Round of Mutual Evaluations – Second Public Consultation. FATF, Paris. 
 
FinAccess (2009). FinAccess National Survey 2009 – Dynamics of Kenya’s Changing Financial 
Landscape. FinAccess, Nairobi. 
 
FinScope (2004). South Africa 2004 – Survey Highlights. FinScope, Midrand. 
 
FinScope (2009). The Demand for, and Barriers to Accessing Financial Services in Tanzania – 
Brochure. FinScope, Dar es Salaam. 
 
Ghate, P.B. (1992). Interaction between the formal and informal financial sectors: The Asian 
experience. World Development 20(6): 859-872. 
 
Gold, S. (2011). The privacy initiative. Biometric Technology Today. June: 9-11. 
 
Goodman, S. and A. Harris (2010). Emerging markets: The coming African tsunami of information 
insecurity. Communications of the ACM, 53(12): 24-27. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011). Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) – Report on the Effectiveness of the Program. IMF, 
Washington DC. 
 
Isern, J. D. and L. de Koker (2009). AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion and Integrity” 
Focus Note. No. 56. CGAP, Washington DC. 
 23
 
Jack, W. and T. Suri (2011). Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA. Working Paper 16721. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, MA. 
 
Jakiela. P and O. Ozier (2011). Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence 
from Village Economies. Working Paper;  
 
Jentzsch, N. (2011). Implications of Mandatory Registration of Mobile Phone Users in Africa, 
Mimeo, DIW Berlin. 
 
Jentzsch, N., A. Harasser and S. Preibusch (forthcoming). Monetising Privacy: an economic 
model for pricing personal information, Report for European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA). 
 
KPMG (2009). Consumers & Convergence III: Consumers Taking Charge. KPMG International. 
 KPMG (2010). Consumers & Convergence IV: Convergence Goes Mainstream – Convenience 
Edges Out Consumer Concerns Over Privacy and Security. KPMG International. 
 
Lippert, O. and M. Walker. (eds.) (1997). The Underground Economy: Global Evidences of its 
Size and Impact. The Frazer Institute, Vancouver, BC. 
 
Mas, I. and D. Radcliffe (2010).  Mobile Payments go Viral: M-PESA in Kenya. Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation 
 
Malakata, M. (2010). SIM card registration stirs concern in Africa, Computerworld, 14 May 2010. 
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=97BAE8AF-1A64-6A71-CE489938A5591ED4 
 
Miller, J. R. (2009). Cell phone tracking can locate terrorists - But only where it's legal. FOXNews. 
18 March 2009. 
 
Morawczynski, O. and G. Miscione (2008). Examining trust in mobile banking transactions: the 
case of M-PESA in Kenya, in Avgerou, C., M.L. Smith, M.L. P. and van den Besselaar  (eds), 
Social Dimensions of Information and Communication Technologies Policy, Springer, New York, 
NY. 
 
Morawczynski, O. (2009). Exploring the usage and impact of “transformational” mobile financial 
services: the case of M-PESA in Kenya. Journal of Eastern African Studies. No 3(3): 509-525 516 
 
Obwona, M. and P. Musinguzi (1998). Savings Mobilisation and Credit Conduits: Formal and 
Informal Financial Sector Linkages. EPRC Research Series, No. 5. Economic Policy Research 
Centre, Kampala. 
 
Olinger, H.N., J.J. Britz and M.S. Olivier (2007). Western privacy and/or unbuntu? Some critical 
comments on the influences in the forthcoming data privacy bill in South Africa. The International 
Information & Library Review 39: 31-43. 
 
Paik, M (2010). Stragglers of the herd get eaten: security concerns for GSM mobile banking 
applications. HotMobile ’10, Annapolis MD. 
 
Pickens, M. (2009). Window on the Unbanked: Mobile Money in the Phillippines. CGAP Brief. 
CGAP, Washington DC.  
 
Pickens, M., D. Porteous and S. Rotman (2009). Scenarios for Branchless Banking. Focus Note. 
No. 57. CGAP, Washington DC. 
 
Platt, A-B., A. Singh, S. Bansal, A. Giri, and A.J. Tiwari (2011). No Thrills – Dormancy in NFA 
Accounts. Microsave India, Lucknow.  
 
Rizzo, F. (2010). Consumers & Convergence - The Risk & Control Perspective. ISACA (South 
Africa) conference, January 2010.  
 
 24
Sharman, J.C. (2009). Privacy as roguery: Personal financial information in an age of 
transparency. Public Administration 87(4): 717-731. 
 
Schneider, F. (2001). ‘What do we know about the shadow economy?’’ Evidence from 21 OECD 
countries. World Economics 2(4): 19–32. 
 
Schneider, F. and D. Enste (2000). Shadow economies: Size, causes and consequences. Journal 
of Economic Literature 38: 77-114. 
 
Schneider, F. (2005). ‘Shadow economies around the world: What do we really know?, 
European Journal of Political Economy 21(3): 598–642. 
 
Schneider, F. and  Enste, D. H. (2007). The Shadow Economy. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Sharman, J.C (2009). Privacy as roguery: Personal financial information in an age of 
transparency. Public Administration. 87(4): 717-731. 
 
Sessay, B-B., T. Karombo and D. Mulupi (2010). SIM card registration continues apace in Africa. 
Audiencescapes, 7 July. 
 
Statistics South Africa (2004). Report on Census Publicity Research Study. Pretoria.  
 
Staschewski, U. (no date). Ghana: Communications authority threatens to cut off unregistered 
cell phones, http://www.africa.fnst-freiheit.org/news/ghana-communications-authority-threatens-
to-cut-off-unregistered-cell-phones 
 
The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Microfinance (2011). Helping or Hurting: What Role for 
Microfinance in the Fight Against Poverty. House of Commons, London.  
 
Thomas, J. J. (1992). Informal Economic Activity. LSE Handbooks in Economics. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
World Savings Banks Institute (WSBI) (2009). Anti-Money Laundering and Combat Financing of 
Terrorism Rules and the Challenge of Financial Inclusion. Position Paper. WSBI, Brussels. 
  
 25
APPENDIX 
Table 1  
Classification 
Service  Providers Government regulation 
Formal  Banks, post banks, insurance companies Banking and insurance laws 
Consumer protection laws 
Formal ‐ other*  SACCOs, microfinance institutions
m‐banking 
Microfinance laws 
SACCO laws 
Informal**  ROSCAs,  ASCAs  and  other  informal  groups  and 
people  
None
Excluded  ‐‐  None
Source: FinScope. *m‐banking has been recently introduced in Tanzania and have been classified as semi‐formal‐
other. ** Note that in some surveys, this excludes family and friends. 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Access Strands in Eight African Countries (Percentage of Adult Population) 
Country   Year  Access strands (mutually exclusive)
      Bold print denotes increase  
    Formal  Formal – other  Informal only  Excluded 
Botswana  2004*  43.2 5.8 4.7 46.3 
  2009  40.8 17.8 8.4 33.0 
Kenya  2006  18.9 26.4 37.5 38.4 
  2009  22.6 40.5 38.7 32.7 
Namibia   2004  44.9 2.8 0.8 51.5 
  2007  45.3 1.5 1.5 51.7 
Nigeria  2008  21.1 2.5 23.9 52.5 
  2010  30.0 6.3 17.4 46.3 
South Africa   2006  50.2 7.3 9.4 33.0 
  2007  59.7 4.4 11.0 24.9 
  2008  62.7 3.1 10.7 23.6 
  2009  59.8 3.8 10.3 26.1 
  2010  62.7 4.9 8.9 23.5 
Tanzania  2006  9.1 2.1 35.1 53.7 
  2009  12.4 4.3 27.3 56.0 
Uganda  2006  18.0 10.0 29.0 43.0 
  2009  22.0 7.0 43.0 28.0 
Zambia   2005  14.6 7.8 11.3 66.3 
  2009  13.9 9.3 14.1 62.7 
Sources: For data sources see Appendix. *Unweighted. 
 
 
   
Figure 1  
Defining Financial Inclusion 
 
Source: Ask Africa and FinMark Trust ‘FinScope 2010 – A Livelihood Approach’ 
 
 
Table 3  
Access to Informal Finance  
Countries  Year 
Percentage of total population 
using informal finance 
Percentage of banked also 
using informal finance 
  Bold print denotes increase 
Botswana  2004*  30.9  51.9 
  2009  33.2 42.2 
Kenya  2006  61** … 
  2009  86.2 13.2 
Namibia   2004  … … 
  2007  8.2 14.3 
Nigeria  2008  … … 
  2010  … … 
South Africa   2006  25.1 27.1 
  2007  38.7 43.7 
  2008  39.8 43.6 
  2009  30.7 37.3 
  2010  32.4 37.4 
Tanzania  2006  … … 
  2009  … … 
Uganda  2006  67.2 59.5 
  2009  61.4 67.1 
Zambia   2005*  … … 
  2009  22.2 35.7 
Source: FinScope. ** Number is taken from Financial Access in Kenya: 2006 Survey Results Dayo Forster FSD Kenya; 
*Unweighted sample. “…” denotes not available. 
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Table 4  
Parallel Usage of Formal and Informal Products 
   Kenya  Nigeria 
South 
Africa  Uganda Zambia 
Categories  2009  2008  2010  2010  2009  2005  2009 
Informal only  26.8  23.9  17  8.9  42  28.8  14.1 
Informal & formal‐other  10.1  1  2  2.1  5  6.8  3.2 
Informal, formal‐other & formal  10.2  2.2  8  19.3  9  5.4  3.3 
Formal & informal  3  4.7  2  7.6  5  3.6  1.7 
N  6,598  21,110  22,569  3,500  3,001  1,186  4,000 
Note: Base adult population (see Appendix). FinScope. See Appendix for explanation of data sources. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 Incentives for Usage of Formal and Informal Financial Services  
Service  Incentives for 
Usage of Formal  
Services 
Incentives to 
Use Informal Services 
Savings  Trust  that  contract  will 
be upheld 
Pricing 
Interest  
Product design 
Trust that contract will be upheld 
Attractive pricing  
Accessibility 
Eligibility 
Social interaction 
 
Credit  Lower interest rates
Availability of credit 
Creation  of  a  formal 
credit record 
Interest rate 
Accessibility
Social interaction (e.g. club) 
 
Transfers  Trust  that  contract  will 
be upheld 
Accessibility  (both  for 
sender and recipient) 
Ease of usage 
 
Trust that contract will be upheld 
Pricing 
Accessibility (both for sender and 
recipient) 
Speed of transfer 
Eligibility 
 
Source: The authors. 
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Data Sources for Table 2 and Table 3 
Country  Year 
% total adult 
population 
(>16 years) 
% total adult 
population 
(>18 years)
Weighted 
sample 
(X)
 
Sources 
Botswana  2004    X Unweighted FinScope 2004 
   2009    X X FinScope 2009 
Kenya  2006    X X FinAccess 2006 
   2009    X X FinAccess 2009 
Namibia   2004  ...    X FinScope 2004 
   2007  X  X FinScope 2007 
Nigeria  2008    X X EFinA Access 2008 
   2010    X X EFinA Access 2010 
South Africa   2006  X   X FinScope 2006 
   2007  X X FinScope 2007 
   2008  X   X FinScope 2008 
   2009  X   X FinScope 2009 
   2010  X    X FinScope 2010 
Tanzania  2006  X    X FinScope 2006 
   2009  X    X FinScope 2009 
Uganda  2006    X X FinScope 2006 
   2009  X    X FinScope 2009 
Zambia   2005  X    X
Measuring Financial Access 
in Zambia FinScope™ 
Zambia 2005 
   2009  X    X FinScope 2009 
Note: ‘…’ denotes ‘not available.’ In Uganda, there has been a switch from one survey to another. 
 
Data Sources for Table 4 
Country   Year  Source 
Kenya  2009  FinAccess National Survey 2009, June 2009
Nigeria  2008 
Financial Services Lanscape Nigeria, based upon 
EFInA Access to Financial Services in Nigeria 2008 Survey 
   2010  EFInA Access to Financial Services in Nigeria 2010 Survey 
South Africa   2010  Ask African and FinMark Trust FinScope 2010 – A Livelihood Approach 
Uganda  2009 
Results of a National Survey on Demand, Usage and Access to Financial Services in 
Uganda ‘FinScope Uganda 2009’ (Report October 2010)
Zambia   2005 
Measuring Financial Access in Zambia FinScope™ Zambia 2005: Summary of
Topline Findings
   2009   FinScope Zambia 2009 Top Line Findings Final Report June 2010 
 
